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I 
INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING OF “NEVER” 
 
What does “never” mean?  This question was illustrated by a problem in Charles Kittel 
and Herbert Kroemer’s textbook Thermal Physics, in which the authors discussed a popular 
hypothetical: the so-called infinite monkey theorem.1  The authors posed a problem: 
                                                          
±
 Dual B.A., Wake Forest University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013.  The original idea 
for this paper comes from my friend and classmate Ryan Delaney, who first conceptualized the idea of a computer 
generating copyrighted material.  I also want to thank other members of Prof. Oskar Liivak’s Topics in Intellectual 
Property seminar (as well as Prof. Liivak himself), all of who provided critical ideas and feedback as this paper was 
written.  Credit for part of the title, as well as a very preliminary version of this idea, should also be given to Robert 
Rogoyski.  See Robert Rogoyski, The Melody Machine: How to Kill Copyright, and Other Problems with Protecting 
Discrete Musical Elements, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 347 (2006). 
1
 CHARLES KITTEL & HERBERT KROEMER, THERMAL PHYSICS 53 (W H Freeman & Co 1980). 
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Suppose that 1010 monkeys have been seated at typewriters through the age of the 
universe, 1018.  This number of monkeys is about three times greater than the present 
human population of the earth.  We suppose that a monkey can hit 10 typewriter keys per 
second.  A typewriter may have 44 keys; we accept lowercase in place of capital letters.  
Assuming that Shakespeare’s Hamlet has 105 characters, will the monkeys hit upon 
Hamlet?2 
 
 As one may imagine from the context of the question, the point of Kittel and Kroemer’s 
question was to illustrate that monkeys would effectively never type out Hamlet: 
The probability that a monkey-Hamlet will be typed in the age of the universe is 
approximately 10164316.  The probability of Hamlet is therefore zero in any operational 
sense of an event, so that the original statement . . . is nonsense: one book, much less a 
library, will never occur in the total literary production of the monkeys.3 
 
 Perhaps thankfully, this paper does not argue that monkeys could potentially produce 
Hamlet.  But it does seek to prove a related point: modern technology has made it theoretically 
possible for a computer system (rather than a monkey) to intentionally generate copyrightable 
work, and copyright law may have difficulty reacting to such an innovation.  In fact, this method 
of content generation – which I call brute-force content creation – could be a very troublesome 
loophole in copyright law. 
 In Part II, I analyze the cryptanalytic method known as brute-forcing4 and how it could be 
used to generate copyrightable content such as images5 and audio.6  Brute-forcing, in layman’s 
terms, is a way in which a computer generates every possible variation (or permutation) of a 
string.7  While brute-forcing has been traditionally used to guess encrypted passwords, I explain 
that it could be used to generate copyrightable content.8  Though I conclude that it is not yet 
                                                          
2
 Id. 
3
 Id. 
4
 See infra Part II. 
5
 See infra Part II.A. 
6
 See infra Part II.B. 
7
 See infra Part II. 
8
 See infra Part II.C. 
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technically feasible to brute-force copyrighted content,9 I devote a short subpart to discussing 
how one might optimize an algorithm to make the process technically feasible.10 
 In Part III, I discuss whether or not such content could be copyrighted.11  I first analyze 
the underlying doctrine that makes brute-force content creation so appealing and so possible: the 
doctrine of independent creation.12  I then turn to whether or not such content would actually be 
copyrightable, focusing on how the relatively weak “modicum of creativity” standard may be a 
bar where an algorithm blindly creates content.13 
 In Part IV, I turn to the legal ramifications of brute-forcing copyrighted content.14  First, I 
address the infringement ramifications of operating a brute-forcing algorithm intended to create 
every possible permutation of creative content.15  Second, I discuss problems of contributory 
liability in two contexts: allowing parties to search through brute-forced content, and allowing 
third parties to buy and/or acquire brute-forced content.16  Third, I discuss how brute-force 
content creation could potentially infringe trademark.17  Finally, I discuss the ramifications of a 
blatant attack on copyright from the perspective of a legal realist.18 
 I conclude in Part V, explaining why it is a good thing that it is currently impossible to 
brute-force content.19 
  
                                                          
9
 Id. 
10
 See infra Part II.D. 
11
 See infra Part III. 
12
 See infra Part III.A. 
13
 See infra Part III.B. 
14
 See infra Part IV. 
15
 See infra Part IV.A. 
16
 See infra Part IV.B. 
17
 See infra Part IV.C. 
18
 See infra Part IV.D. 
19
 See infra Part V. 
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II 
BRUTE FORCE ATTACKS 101 
 
Before I begin an analysis of the legal ramifications of a brute-force attack on 
copyrightable material, I must explain how such brute-force attacks would be feasible at all.  As 
relatively laborious as this explanation is, it helps illustrate why such an algorithm is, in 
consideration of modern technology, purely theoretical. 
How hard is it to guess a password?  The answer is, “it depends.”  When passwords are 
stored in plain text – that is, when they are stored exactly as the user enters them – all it takes for 
a nefarious party to acquire a user’s password is access to the computer storing the user’s 
password itself.  But this is a rare event: most modern websites and services use cryptographic 
functions like MD5,20 which are one-way non-reversible encryption algorithms.21  These 
encryption algorithms take an input (usually a password) and generate a long, unique,22 and un-
decipherable fingerprint-like string (a “message digest”).23  The upshot of these one-way non-
reversible encryption algorithms is that, even if a nefarious hacker got access to many of these 
“fingerprints,” there would be no way for them to un-encrypt the “fingerprints” themselves.24 
But one-way encryption algorithms like MD5 are not fool-proof: there are many ways in 
which someone with an one-way-encrypted string could eventually determine what a user’s 
password is.  “Rainbow tables,” or pre-calculated lists of what-password-equals-what-
                                                          
20
 MD5 is an acronym for “Message Digest Algorithm 5.”  See R. Rivest, Network Working Group, RFC 
1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DATATRACKER (Apr. 1992), 
available at http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc1321/. 
21
 See generally id. 
22
 This is no longer the case with MD5, which is susceptible to collision attacks.  See Tao Xie & Dengguo 
Feng, How to Find Weak Input Differences for MD5 Collision Attacks, CRYPTOLOGY (May 30, 2009), available at 
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/223.pdf (finding weak input differences in the MD5 protocol). 
23
 R. Rivest, Network Working Group, RFC 1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, INTERNET 
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DATATRACKER (Apr. 1992), available at http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc1321/ (“It is 
conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce two messages having the same message digest, or to 
produce any message having a given prespecified target message digest.”). 
24
 At least insofar as the mechanisms behind algorithms like MD5 remain a secret. 
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fingerprint, are commonplace online and relatively easy to find.25  But these tables are often 
limited to what is computationally feasible: many only cover passwords up to 10 characters in 
length.26  Some forms of social engineering,27 such as pretending to be tech support and 
verifying a user-provided password against a “fingerprint,” also work in certain circumstances.28 
But there is another option that is relevant not only to password cracking, but also to the 
world of copyright: brute-force attacks. 
A brute-force attack is a cryptanalytic29 attack that exhaustively guesses every possible 
permutation of a string until it finds the correct solution.30  As the title implies, brute-forcing is 
more or less the cryptanalytic equivalent of jamming random thin objects into a lock until it 
opens – it entails guessing every single possible option until one option eventually works.  In the 
context of the cryptographic “fingerprints” mentioned above, it involves encrypting every single 
possible string until the right “fingerprint” comes out, which means you have input the user’s 
password. 
The number of potential variations of a string (like a password) is calculated using two 
variables: the number of characters usable in the target string (the “character set”), and the 
maximum length of the target string: 31 
 	 
       ! 
                                                          
25
 For example, the RainbowCrack project lists a large number of LM, NTLM, MD5, and SHA1 rainbow 
tables.  List of Rainbow Tables, RAINBOWCRACK PROJECT, available at http://project-rainbowcrack.com/table.htm 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
26
 See id. (the longest table, “md5_loweralpha-numeric#1-10,” which contains passwords up to 10 
characters long, only covers lower alphanumeric characters).   
27
 Social engineering is the art of tricking people into divulging secret information, including passwords. 
This can include everything from pretending to be corporate tech support to creating false log-in forms that record a 
user’s password.  See generally JOHNNY LONG & KEVIN D MITNICK, NO TECH HACKING: A GUIDE TO SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING, DUMPSTER DIVING, AND SHOULDER SURFING (2008). 
28
 See id. 
29
 Cryptanalysis is “is the science and sometimes art of breaking cryptosystems.”  CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN 
PELZL, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 3 (2010). 
30
 Id. at 7.   
31
 See NICK MOLDOVYAN & ALEX MOLDOVYAN, INNOVATIVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 63 (2nd ed. 2007). 
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As the length of a string exponentially increases the number of its permutations, brute-
force attacks are ridiculously inefficient against relatively lengthy passwords.  By way of 
example, assuming a password potentially comprised of the full 95 printable ASCII characters32 
with a maximum length of 8 characters (such as the string “C()rnell”): 
 	 
 “Crnell”   95+    6,634,204,312,890,625 
In other words, this password would have well over six quadrillion possible variations.  
While a computer attempting to brute force this password may not have to calculate every single 
one of these permutations to discover the password is “C()rnell” (it might begin with “C” before 
it goes to “D” and thus try “C()rnell” before it tries “D()rnell”), this large number of 
permutations all but guarantees that any effort to guess a password would require an incredible 
amount of time and computing power.33 
In comparison, a much shorter password comprised of nothing but the 26 lower case 
letters of the alphabet and only 5 characters – say, the word “cases” – would only have nearly 12 
million possible permutations:  
 	 
 “cases”   267    11,881,376 
It is thus easy to understand why websites like Facebook that require a password prefer 
lengthy passwords using more than the lower-case alphabet:34 doing so raises the potential 
number of permutations (and thus the difficulty of brute-forcing a password) exponentially. 
  
                                                          
32
 See RANDALL HYDE, THE ART OF ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE § 2.14.1 (2nd ed. 2010). 
33
 For a full discussion of the computing power required to brute-force strings, see infra Part II.C. 
34
 For example, Facebook’s help guide asks that users make a password “at least 6 characters long” using 
“a complex combination of numbers, letters, and punctuation marks.”  What is the Minimum Password Strength and 
How Can I Make My Password Strong?, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/help/124904560921566 (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
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A. IMAGES AND VIDEO 
Because digital images can be reduced to a string in a manner not dissimilar to a 
password, it is theoretically feasible to brute-force an image. 
Digital images are displayed using pixels – that is, miniature dots on a computer monitor 
that, when placed together in a matrix, display an image.  For example, Google’s default main 
page logo is 550 pixels wide and 190 pixels tall35 – in other words, a series of 104,500 pixels.  
Each pixel in the Google logo is, for compression reasons, 8 bits, which allows each pixel to 
display one of 256 colors.36  This is as if the Google logo was a 104,500 character string 
comprised of a 256 character color alphabet:  
 	 
 9:; ;:   256<=>,7== 
Suffice to say, the number of permutations of the Google logo is rather large: too large to 
print here, and certainly too large to brute force.  More specifically, the length of the number of 
permutations itself has 251,662 decimal digits – more than two hundred times more decimal 
digits than characters in this paragraph.  This result does not even involve an image with an 
aesthetically pleasing number of colors: most images today use 24-bit color, which allows for 
16,777,216 different possible colors in a single pixel.37 
 Even smaller, less detailed images still result in an incredible number of permutations.  
For example, a 1-bit image (that is, an image with only black pixels and white pixels) with 100 
pixels (that is, an image 10 pixels wide and 10 pixels tall) would still have 
                                                          
35
 See [Google Logo], https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo4w.png. 
36
 See id. 
37
 I am omitting a discussion of 32-bit color because it only adds 256 levels of transparency, which are 
unlikely to be used in most copyrighted images.  See Bit Depth, U. OF CAMBRIDGE DEP’T OF CHEMICAL 
ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, http://www.ceb.cam.ac.uk/pages/bit-depth.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  
For similar reasons, I omit a discussion of all forms of so-called “deep color” consisting of more than 24 bits per 
pixel, as such a color gamut is unnecessary for brute-forcing purposes.  See JOE CELKO, JOE CELKO'S THINKING IN 
SETS: AUXILIARY, TEMPORAL, AND VIRTUAL TABLES IN SQL 168 (Morgan Kaufmann 2008).  
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1,267,650,600,228,229,401,496,703,205,376 (that is, over one nonillion) permutations.  That is 
more permutations than there are grains of sand on the earth.38 
 There is an alternative approach to brute-forcing very large images with an astronomical 
numbers of pixels: bitwise brute-forcing.  All computer data is currently39 stored as strings of 
zeroes and ones, known as bits.40  Instead of brute-forcing an image pixel-by-pixel, it may be 
more feasible to brute-force larger images bit-by-bit.  For example, wallpaper images often have 
a resolution of 1920 pixels by 1080 pixels, which is the width and height of a 1080p/1080i 
screen.41  When somewhat compressed42 into a JPEG file, such an image with a bit depth of 24 
bits (or 16,777,216 colors) can be as small as 490 kilobytes, or 4,014,080 bits.43   The difference 
in permutations can be staggering:  
 	 
 1920?1080 : @A B?;C   16,777,216D,E=>,===
F    G H 16.6 ;; J; J: 
 	 
 1920?1080 : @K
L9, 44 GC   2>,=<>,=+=  
F    G H 1.2 ;; J; J: 
                                                          
38
 Researchers estimate that there are approximately 7.5 x 1018 (or roughly seven quintillion) grains of sand 
on the earth.  See Robert Krulwich, Which Is Greater, The Number Of Sand Grains On Earth Or Stars In The Sky?, 
NPR KRULWICH WONDERS (Sept. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/krulwich/2012/09/17/161096233/which-is-greater-the-number-of-sand-grains-on-earth-or-
stars-in-the-sky. 
39
 Quantum computing “qbits” may replace traditional bits in the future.  See TZVETAN S. METODI, ARVIN I. 
FARUQUE & FREDERIC T. CHONG, QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR COMPUTER ARCHITECTS 7 (2011) (discussing 
classical bits and quantum signal states). 
40
 See id. 
41
 See generally EUR. BROADCASTING UNION, HIGH DEFINITION (HD) IMAGE FORMATS FOR TELEVISION 
PRODUCTION (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20091229093957/http://tech.ebu.ch/docs/tech/tech3299.pdf. 
42
 Using a JPEG quality rating of 70 in Adobe Photoshop CS6.  This is a very rough approximation – JPEG 
images of the same resolution often vary in terms of their quality and size.  A true JPEG-based brute-forcing 
algorithm would unquestionably need to account for such variation. 
43
 Assuming “kilobyte” means 8,192 bits. 
44
 This is an oversimplified example of brute-forcing JPEG.  To actually conduct JPEG brute-forcing, the 
algorithm would have to somewhat intelligently brute-force based upon the JPEG File Interchange Format, which 
would include adding, among other things, file headers.  See generally ERIC HAMILTON, JPEG FILE INTERCHANGE 
FORMAT VERSION 1.02 (1992), available at http://www.w3.org/Graphics/JPEG/jfif3.pdf. 
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 Thus, in certain circumstances, it may be efficient to abandon the pixel-by-pixel approach 
described above and instead simply brute-force an image bit-by-bit. 
 Using similar principles, it would be entirely feasible to turn any of these images into 
video.  Such a video could be comprised of already brute-forced images, which themselves 
become the character set for a string comprised of frames.  For example, at 24 frames per second, 
a one-hour silent movie the size of the Google logo would simply add another exponent: 
 	 
   	 ; HJ   256<=>,7==
+M,>==
 
B. AUDIO 
Like images, audio can be expressed as a series of bits.  Thus, just like how images can 
be brute-forced bit-by-bit,45 audio could theoretically be brute-forced bit-by-bit. 
Audio files (such as MP3 files) of songs are usually available in a wide range of bit rates; 
however, enthusiast testing has generally come to the conclusion that few listeners can discern 
any difference between files with bit rates above 160kbit/sec.46  Thankfully, when creating 
music, it is not necessary to generate audio of a perfect quality.  Thus, the slightly distorted (but 
nonetheless arguably listenable) 128kbit/sec constant bit rate is sufficient for brute-forcing 
purposes.47 
128kbit/sec means 131,072 bits per second, where a bit is a Boolean value of zero or one.  
Thus:  
                                                          
45
 See supra Part II.A. 
46
 The “Great MP3 Bitrate Experiment” came to the conclusion that there was virtually no perceivable 
difference in the audio quality of 160kbit/sec VBR (variable bit rate), 320kbit/sec CBR (constant bit rate), 
192kbit/sec VBR, and raw CD audio.  Jeff Atwood, Concluding the Great MP3 Bitrate Experiment, CODING 
HORROR (June 27, 2012), http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2012/06/concluding-the-great-mp3-bitrate-
experiment.html.   
47
 The 128kbit/sec bit rate is admittedly insufficient for high quality audio.  Id.  I nonetheless use 
128kbit/sec for calculations for two reasons: first, perfect audio quality is not strictly necessary to produce 
copyrightable material, and second, the bit rate of the audio file directly influences the size of the exponent in 
determining permutations (meaning a lower bitrate begets fewer permutations).  Suffice to say, the lower the bitrate, 
the better. 
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 	 
  J @128 N/C  2<E<,=PD 
That is, a number with 39,457 decimal digits.  As the average song is four minutes long,48 
this means that the average song has 240 times the potential bits: 
 	 
 	  @128 N/C  2E<,>7P,D+= 
 Or, a number with over 9.4 million decimal digits. 
 Some audio brute-forcing could also be achieved by brute-forcing the MIDI format.  The 
MIDI49 data format is a simplistic way in which instruments can be sequenced and re-played 
digitally.50  Because the format does not store actual recordings and rather stores a sequence of 
notes to re-play a song (like a sort of digital sheet music), MIDI does not act as an audio 
recording,51 and thus MIDI would be a poor replacement for most songs except for certain forms 
of audio (such as very basic melodies and compositions).  
C. FEASIBILITY 
 As repeatedly emphasized, brute-forcing is a computationally expensive, inefficient, and 
normatively over-the-top approach to generating anything.  Bluntly, though it may be 
theoretically feasible to brute-force copyrighted material, it is anything but technically feasible to 
do so with current technology. 
                                                          
48
 Michael Twardos, Probability Distribution of Song Length in a Collection of Itunes Libraries, THE 
INFORMATION DIET (Nov. 16, 2011), http://theinformationdiet.blogspot.com/2011/11/probability-distribution-of-
song-length.html (“The distribution shows the relative likelihood of the length of a song. This plot was calculated 
from over 70,000 songs from 12 (American) libraries. The median of this plot is 231 seconds ans the mean is at 242 
seconds. This observation may indicate something fundamental about people(culturally or biologically): we like 
songs that are almost exactly 4 minutes. As you move away from the 4 minute mark, the probability drops in similar 
amounts (the plot is symmetric-ish).”). 
49
 MIDI stands for “Musical Instrument Digital Interface.”  See JEFFREY HASS, INTRODUCTION TO 
COMPUTER MUSIC: VOLUME ONE ch. 3, available at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~emusic/etext/MIDI/chapter3_MIDI.shtml. 
50
 See generally id.  A very similar idea was discussed in the context of a “Melody Machine” by Robert 
Rogoyski. Robert Rogoyski, The Melody Machine: How to Kill Copyright, and Other Problems with Protecting 
Discrete Musical Elements, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 347, 351 (2006). 
51
 See id. 
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 Scholarly work discussing the feasibility of brute-forcing rarely goes beyond simple 
examples because it usually needs not do so.  For the most rudimentary of brute-forcing 
algorithms, the math is simple: the total number of permutations is divided by the number of 
permutations that can be processed by a computer in some time unit:52   
   !

 B  
 
For example, Raza et al. have calculated that a single computer calculating 1,000 
password permutations per second could brute-force an 8-character password comprised of lower 
case letters (that is, 268 or 208,827,064,576 permutations) in roughly 58,007.52 hours, or a little 
over six years.53  As the Sun is estimated to burn out in six billion years,54 it would burn out well 
before that same computer could even begin to generate all of the permutations of a four-minute 
song.55    
 But 1,000 password permutations per second is an absolute joke for any real time 
expenditure analysis, as some security websites estimate that even the ancient Pentium 100 
processor could guess 10,000 passwords per second.56  More modern technology must be used to 
realistically estimate the time to calculate permutations. 
                                                          
52
 See Raza et al., A Survey of Password Attacks and Comparative Analysis on Methods for Secure 
Authentication, 19 (4) WORLD APPLIED SCI. J., 439, 439 (2012); see also Jain et al., New Modified 256-bit Message 
Digest Algorithm Based on Existing Algorithms, 3:1 J. COMPUTING TECH. 2278–3814 (July 2012) (analyzing brute 
force time against various key sizes and permutations).  Note with extremely long strings, more time is necessarily 
spent storing and processing those strings, implicating a different formula. 
53
 Raza et al., A Survey of Password Attacks and Comparative Analysis on Methods for Secure 
Authentication, 19 (4) WORLD APPLIED SCI. J., 439, 439 (2012). 
54
 See Fraser Cain, Life of the Sun, UNIVERSE TODAY (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://www.universetoday.com/18847/life-of-the-sun/. 
55
 The calculation is too large to print, but suffice to say, a number with 924 thousand decimal places does 
not become much smaller when divided by the 31,540,000 seconds there are in a year.  That number of years is 
certainly larger than the six billion years of hydrogen in the Sun.  See id. 
56
 See Password Recovery Speeds, LOCKDOWN.CO.UK – THE HOME COMPUTER SECURITY CENTRE, 
http://www.lockdown.co.uk/?pg=combi#classA (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
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 In December of 2012, password cracking expert Jeremi Gosney unveiled a Linux and 
OpenCL-based GPU server cluster comprising of 5 servers utilizing 25 AMD Radeon graphics 
cards.57  This cluster has computing power capable of guessing 350 billion passwords per 
second.58  The servers require 7kW of electricity when operational59 and likely cost well over 
$10,000.60   
But even Gosney’s veritable supercomputer(s) couldn’t take on creative content. 
 Would Gosney’s servers be able to brute-force the Google logo?  Not in the Sun’s 
lifetime.61  As explained above, the Google logo has 256104,500 possible permutations.62  The 
number of years it would take to brute-force this password with a single one of Gosney’s server 
clusters is so large that, like the number of permutations of the logo, it cannot even be printed 
here.  Specifically, the number of years it would take to brute-force the Google logo has 251,643 
decimal digits. 
                                                          
57
 Dan Goodin, 25-GPU Cluster Cracks Every Standard Windows Password in <6 Hours, ARS TECHNICA 
(Dec. 9, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/12/25-gpu-cluster-cracks-every-standard-windows-password-
in-6-hours/. 
58
 Id.  This is when the GPU cluster brute-forces NTLM passwords and not more complex hashes.  
Arguably, the fact that such calculations are based on NTLM encryptions is insignificant: a brute-force content 
creation algorithm would ideally be as computationally simple as the NTLM protocol, if not more so. 
59
 JEREMI M. GOSNEY, PASSWORD CRACKING HPC, PASSWORDS^12 SECURITY CONF. 17 (Dec. 13, 2012), 
available at http://passwords12.at.ifi.uio.no/Jeremi_Gosney_Password_Cracking_HPC_Passwords12.pdf. 
60
 The cluster contains 10 AMD Radeon HD 7970s, 4 AMD Radeon HD 5970s, 3 AMD Radeon HD 6990s, 
and 1 AMD Radeon HD 5870.  Id.  The cost of a HD 7970 is approximately $479.  See Hassan Mujtaba, AMD 
Officially Announces Price-Cuts for Radeon HD 7000 Series, HD 7970 Now Available for $479 MSRP, WCCF 
TECH, http://wccftech.com/amd-officially-announces-pricecuts-radeon-hd-7000-series-hd-7970-479-msrp/ (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2013).  The price of a dual-GPU HD 5970 is approximately $599.  Matthew Murray, AMD Releases 
Dual-GPU Radeon HD 5970 Card, PC MAG. (Nov. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2356053,00.asp.  The price of an HD 6990 is approximately $700.  Sal 
Cangeloso, AMD Announces the Ridiculously Powerful $700 Radeon HD 6990 Graphics Card, GEEK.COM (Mar. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.geek.com/chips/amd-announces-the-ridiculously-powerful-700-radeon-hd-6990-
graphics-card-1320191/.  The price of an HD 5870 is approximately $379.  Ryan Smith, AMD’s Radeon HD 5870: 
Bringing About the Next Generation of GPUs, ANANDTECH (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://www.anandtech.com/show/2841.  This means that the graphics cards in Gosney’s servers could have cost as 
much as $9,665.00, not including the enclosure, processors, motherboards, and the like.  But many of these prices 
(except for 7970’s price) are launch prices, meaning an equivalent server could be slightly cheaper today.  Thus, for 
simplicity’s sake and without better information, I estimate the price of one of Gosney’s servers to be roughly 
$10,000. 
61
 The Sun is estimated to burn out in six billion years.  See Fraser Cain, Life of the Sun, UNIVERSE TODAY 
(Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.universetoday.com/18847/life-of-the-sun/. 
62
 See supra Part II.A. 
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 Gosney’s servers could not even brute-force a simple poem.  For example, W.B. Yeats’ 
He wishes for the Cloths of Heaven is a relatively short poem with 327 characters, including 
spaces.63  Using the ASCII 95-character set,64 this would entail 95327 permutations.  Even with 
the power of Gosney’s servers, it would still take more years than ever documented in human 
history to brute force Yeats’ poem – more specifically, a number of years so large it has 628 
decimal digits. 
 These astronomical figures are not made any more tolerable by throwing more servers at 
the problem.  Adding another server would certainly double the workload, but would cost yet 
another $10,000 and yet another 7kW of electricity.65   Assuming one had the 2011 GDP of the 
United States – $14.99 trillion dollars66 – this means that one could only buy at best 
1,499,000,000 of Gosney’s servers, not including electrical/storage/facility/other expenses.  The 
result?  It would still require a number of years with 619 (that is, 9 fewer) decimal digits to brute-
force Yeats’ poem and a number of years with 251,633 (that is, 10 fewer) decimal digits to brute-
force the Google logo! 
 These rough calculations only scratch the surface of the feasibility problem – storing 
permutations is also an issue.  Take, again, the Google logo, an image with 256104,500 possible 
permutations.67  The Google logo is approximately 18 kilobytes in size, which is approximately 
20 kilobytes as stored on a hard disk.68  To brute-force and store every possible permutation of 
the Google logo, a programmer would have to make available so many terabytes that the number 
                                                          
63
 See W. B. YEATS, THE WIND AMONG THE REEDS 26 (Kessinger Publ’g 2004). 
64
 See RANDALL HYDE, THE ART OF ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE § 2.14.1 (2nd ed. 2010). 
65
 See JEREMI M. GOSNEY, PASSWORD CRACKING HPC, PASSWORDS^12 SECURITY CONFERENCE 17 (Dec. 
13, 2012), available at http://passwords12.at.ifi.uio.no/Jeremi_Gosney_Password_Cracking_HPC_Passwords12.pdf. 
66
 Data: United States, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013). 
67
 See supra Part II.A; see also [Google Logo], https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo4w.png. 
68
 See id. 
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of terabytes alone has over 250,000 decimal digits.69  This is exponentially more storage than the 
telecommunications capacity of the entire world.70  Yeats’ poem does not fare much better – 
though in plain-text it is only 335 bytes (or 0.327148 kilobytes),71 it would require a number of 
terabytes of storage with 851 decimal digits72 – that is, still well over the entire 
telecommunications capacity of the entire world.73 
 Thus, Kroemer and Kittel were as right with computers as they were with monkeys:74 if 
the entire GDP of the United States can barely influence the amount of time it would take to 
brute-force a copyrighted work, then it would be truly impossible to do so with current 
technology absent some sort of ground-breaking invention,75 an exponential increase in 
worldwide computing power,76 or dumb luck.77 
D. “SMARTER” BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS 
 The above calculations illustrate quite well the inefficiency of brute-force attacks – as 
complexity raises the possible number of permutations exponentially, brute-force attacks are all 
but useless except for guessing the shortest of strings.  Perhaps thankfully, beyond leveraging the 
                                                          
69
 Where 1024 bytes = 1 kilobyte, 1024 kilobytes = 1 megabyte, 1024 megabytes = 1 gigabyte, and 1024 
gigabytes = 1 terabyte.  ITL EDUC. SOLUTIONS LTD., INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE 109 (2nd ed. 2011). 
70
 The entire effective capacity in 2007 was calculated to be 65,000 petabytes.  See Martin Hilbert & 
Priscilla López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 223:6205 
SCI. 60 (Apr. 2011). 
71
 See W. B. YEATS, THE WIND AMONG THE REEDS 26 (Kessinger Publ’g 2004). 
72
 Where 1024 bytes = 1 kilobyte, 1024 kilobytes = 1 megabyte, 1024 megabytes = 1 gigabyte, and 1024 
gigabytes = 1 terabyte.  ITL EDUC. SOLUTIONS LTD., INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE 109 (2nd ed. 2011). 
73
 See Martin Hilbert & Priscilla López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and 
Compute Information, 223:6205 SCI. 60 (Apr. 2011). 
74
 See supra Part I. 
75
 Such as the fascinating technology of quantum computing.  See generally TZVETAN S. METODI, ARVIN I. 
FARUQUE & FREDERIC T. CHONG, QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR COMPUTER ARCHITECTS (2011). 
76
 The numbers discussed in this subpart indicate that it would have to be a very large exponential increase, 
far beyond the scope of Moore’s Law (which may be an increasingly poor benchmark).  See S. Borkar, Obeying 
Moore’s Law Beyond 0.18 Micron [Microprocessor Design], PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANNUAL IEEE INT’L 
ASIC/SOC CONF. (2001). 
77
 Matt Kane, a Chicago artist, purported to make this possible through a website called “PixelMonkeys,” 
which outputs a single random permutation of an image based upon input parameters.  Kane thus purported to leave 
the possibility that a copyrighted work would be duplicated up to chance.  See Matt Kane, The Pixel Monkeys 
Theory, PIXELMONKEYS.COM, http://www.pixelmonkeys.org/#theory (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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entire GDP of the United States,78 there is hope for those looking to brute-force the content 
industry: “smart” methods of brute-forcing.  As will be explained later,79 “smart” brute-forcing 
solves two problems: not only can “smart” brute-forcing exponentially reduce the number of 
permutations for any given string, but it can also solve various issues related to making those 
permutations copyrightable.80 
 Any attempt to make brute-forcing “smarter” must fulfill a very important requirement: 
the processing time added from the addition of “smart” code in the algorithm must be less than 
the processing time expended by generating the unnecessary permutations.  There is no point to 
adding “smart” code to an algorithm to reduce the possible number of permutations when there is 
no processing time saved (or, worse yet, where there is processing time added) by doing so.  
Because such balancing would necessarily occur on a case-by-case basis, this subpart can 
unfortunately only discuss the topic obliquely. 
 One way to exponentially reduce the number of permutations for any given format is to 
brute-force with large chunks of data, as opposed to individual bits or characters.  For example, 
to brute-force a novel, it would not be necessary or efficient to guess every single letter of that 
novel – rather, one could save time by brute-forcing using a character set composed of dictionary 
words.  While this increases the character set, it also lessens the length of the string, and thus the 
resulting number of permutations is shortened exponentially. 
 The efficiency of this “chunk-based” brute-forcing is best illustrated with poetry.  Robert 
Frost’s poem The Road Not Taken is 729 characters (including spaces), but only 144 words.81  
                                                          
78
 See supra Part II.C. 
79
 See infra Part III.B. 
80
 See id. 
81
 See ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN, BIRCHES, AND OTHER POEMS 9 (Coyote Canyon Press 
2010). 
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Ignoring punctuation and formatting, the difference in possible permutations is quite evident, 
even taking into account the approximately 250,000 different words in the English dictionary:82 

 
    95PDQ  F  R  G 1,442 J; J: 

 
 GJ   250,000<>>  F  R  G 778 J; J: 
 Thus, when the length of the possible string being brute-forced is lessened by grouping 
the character set into “chunks,” the number of permutations is lessened greatly.  These “chunks” 
could, at least theoretically, be anything – short sounds, small images, digital simulations of 
paintbrushes, etc.  
 Brute-forcing can also be made “smarter” by the use of creative rules and an algorithm 
that “learns.”  Take, again, a poem.  Suffice to say, few poets would write a poem that repeats the 
same word incessantly, meaning that an algorithm could skip over a possible permutation that 
involves the same word repeated more than three times in a row.  Similarly, the same algorithm 
could learn basic linguistic rules, such as the operation of adjectives and adverbs and the use of 
articles such as “a” and “an.”  A truly gifted programmer could also construct an algorithm that 
mimics common linguistic tropes such as rhyming, alliteration, and the like to further limit the 
number of potential permutations.  And it goes without saying that the programmer able to create 
a creatively gifted artificial neural network83 would not only make their brute-forcing program 
smarter, but would also revolutionize the entire computing world.  
  
                                                          
82
 How Many Words Are There in the English Language?, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/words/how-many-words-are-there-in-the-english-language (last visited Mar. 23, 
2013) (“[T]here are, at the very least, a quarter of a million distinct English words, excluding inflections, and words 
from technical and regional vocabulary not covered by the OED, or words not yet added to the published dictionary, 
of which perhaps 20 per cent are no longer in current use.”). 
83
 Artificial neural networks are “nonlinear mapping systems whose structure is loosely based on principles 
observed in the nervous system of humans and animals.”  RUSSELL D. REED & ROBERT J. MARKS, NEURAL 
SMITHING : SUPERVISED LEARNING IN FEEDFORWARD ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 1 (Bradford Books 1999). 
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III 
CAN BRUTE-FORCED WORKS BE COPYRIGHTED? 
 
Despite the fact that the preceding Part II all but stated that brute-forcing media is 
technically impossible,84 there is still a remote possibility that a clever programmer (or, more 
realistically, a collection of clever programmers) could brute-force copyright.  Though it would 
be nearly impossible to brute-force a four-minute song using the most inefficient brute-forcing 
methods,85 using tactics similar to the “smart” brute-forcing tactics describe above,86 it is at least 
conceivable that one could construct a music-making algorithm that generated Top 40 songs at 
some point in the future (and hopefully before the Sun burns out87). 
But technical feasibility is only the beginning.  Assuming, for the sake of the argument, 
that the brute-forcing of any form of media was technically possible, could what an algorithm 
generates actually be copyrighted?  That rather important question is precisely the subject this 
Part addresses. 
A. INDEPENDENT CREATION BY AN ALGORITHM 
The doctrine of independent creation is the crux upon which the entire concept of brute-
forcing copyright rests. 
Copyright law, as its name entails, prohibits unauthorized copying.88  To establish a case 
of copyright infringement vis-à-vis violation of the right to reproduce a work,89 a plaintiff must 
                                                          
84
 See supra Part II. 
85
 See supra Part II.B. 
86
 See supra Part II.D. 
87
 See supra Part II.C (briefly discussing the lifespan of the Sun as a reference against the feasibility of 
brute-force attacks). 
88
 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER SETH MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 417 (6th ed. Aspen Law & Bus. 2012) (“Copyrights do not give their owner the exclusive 
right to prevent others from making, using, or selling their creations. Rather, they give the author only the right to 
prevent unauthorized copying of their works, as well as the right to prevent some limited types of uses of those 
works”). 
89
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
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prove either directly or circumstantially that the defendant copied her copyrighted work.90  
Because direct copying is often difficult to prove, plaintiffs can circumstantially prove copying 
by showing that a defendant had (1) access to the plaintiff’s work and that there was (2) a 
substantial similarity between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s work.91 
The doctrine of independent creation, a “cornerstone” of copyright law,92 is a rebuttal of a 
plaintiff’s case of direct or circumstantial copyright infringement which argues that the alleged 
infringer created the allegedly infringing work wholly independently of the copyright holder’s 
work and usually without knowledge of that work.93  In this way, the doctrine tracks the 
requirement that all creative works must be independently created to be original and therefore 
amenable to copyrighting.94 
In Mazer v. Stein,95 the Supreme Court provided an example of when the doctrine of 
independent creation applies: 
Two men, each a perfectionist, independently make maps of the same territory. Though 
the maps are identical each may obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his 
particular map, and yet neither will infringe the other's copyright.96 
 
But, of course, independent creation does not only protect creative works that are based 
off of some constant referent, like how maps are (hopefully) based upon the geography of a 
region.97  As eloquently stated by Learned Hand in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,98 
                                                          
90
 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 520; see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 
1946); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).  This test is also phrased in a way that 
requires proof of “improper appropriation,” see MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 527; however, this 
is not discussed here because brute-force content creation does not by definition involve the sort of 
character/trope/detail specific variations typically involved in such an analysis.  See Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (comparing two different plays by analyzing such details). 
91
 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th 
Cir. 1997); see also MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 520–527. 
92
 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:32 (2012). 
93
 See id; see also Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2002). 
94
 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 421. 
95
 347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954). 
96
 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18, 74 S. Ct. 460, 470–71, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954) (citing Fred Fisher, 
Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)). 
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[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on 
a Grecian Urn, he would be an “author,” and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy 
that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.99 
 
In other words, when two parties create the same work, both independently own a 
copyright in their respective works even if the two works are exactly the same.100  This is not the 
case in patent law, which gives a patent holder the right to prevent the independent creation of a 
patented invention for the duration of the patent.101  
Because an argument of independent creation often implicitly concedes the second prong 
of a circumstantial copying case102 – that is, the similarity of the plaintiff’s work and the 
defendant’s work – independent creation cases often hinge on the degree of access that the 
defendant had to the plaintiff’s work.103  Along these lines, the best invocations of the 
independent creation doctrine are made by defendants who could not have possibly had any 
access to the plaintiff’s work – for example, a musician on a remote island with no radio 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
97
 Naturally, in the context of maps and other materials based upon constant referents, courts have found 
the doctrine of independent creation quite useful.  See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150–51 
(S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“No one doubts that two directories, independently made, are each entitled to copyright, regardless 
of their similarity, even though it amount to identity. Each being the result of original work, the second will be 
protected, quite regardless of its lack of novelty. But the best instance is in the case of maps. Here, if each be 
faithful, identity is inevitable, because each seeks only to set down the same facts in precisely the same relations to 
each other. So far as each is successful, each will be exactly the same.”). 
98
 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). 
99
 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). 
100
 See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
101
 See 2 JOHN MILLS, DONALD REILEY & ROBERT HIGHLEY, PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 6:3 (2d ed.) (“A 
copyright, unlike a patent, does not give its owner ‘the right to exclude’ anyone who created the work independently 
of the author through whom the copyright is derived.”); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 
90 VA. L. REV. 465, 525 (2004) (“Independent creation is no defense to a claim of patent infringement.”). 
102
 With alternate pleading and the like, this is not always the case. 
103
 Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (discussing how similarity is 
inherent in the independent creation of “faithful” maps).  Note that some courts view the relationship between 
similarity and access as a sliding scale.  See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“If, therefore, two works are so similar as to make it highly probable that the later one is a copy of the earlier 
one, the issue of access need not be addressed separately, since if the later work was a copy its creator must have 
had access to the original.”) (citing Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984)); Carew v. R.K.O. Radio 
Pictures, 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (“If there is identity, then access is, in itself, of no importance 
whatsoever”). Ostensibly, this sliding scale is merely a presumption that can be rebutted by showing the legitimate 
possibility of independent creation.   
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access.104  Of course, a defendant does not need to abscond to a remote island to claim 
independent creation: even where plausible arguments are made that a defendant may have had 
access to a work, courts are reluctant to find access without a strong showing of substantial 
similarity, and even then such a finding is not automatic.105 
It almost goes without saying that a brute-force content creation algorithm is the ideal 
artificial musician on a remote island without radio access.106  A brute-force content creation 
algorithm cannot deliberately or accidentally duplicate copyrighted works unless programmed to 
do so.  When such an algorithm creates works substantially similar to the others’ works, it does 
so without even the remotest hint of access, providing the perfect defense to any allegation of 
copying.  
But this application of independent creation to brute-force content creation may rely upon 
an unnecessarily formal understanding of independent creation.  Professor Clarisa Long of the 
University of Virginia has argued that the independent creation privilege exists, at least in part, 
as a mechanism to impose an actual notice requirement on alleged infringers.107  This makes a lot 
of sense: the common examples of independent creation are not where an infringer intentionally 
avoids copyrighted material to “accidentally” duplicate it, but rather where that infringer is 
unintentionally unaware of the existence of similar copyrighted material.108  If Long is correct 
and the doctrine of independent creation is a question of actual notice, then a brute-force content 
                                                          
104
 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:36 (2012). 
105
 See, e.g., Sarkadi v. Wiman, 135 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1943) (finding plaintiff's showings of access and 
indirect showings of access by similarity insufficient); see also 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:28 
(2012) (“Independent creation may, nevertheless, still be found where plaintiff referred to (but did not copy) 
another's work, and, where plaintiff received only ideas or suggestions from others.”). 
106
 See 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:36 (2012) (giving the remote island hypothetical). 
107
 Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 529 (2004); see also 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 345–46 
(1989) (discussing search costs avoided through the doctrine of independent creation). 
108
 See supra Part II.A (providing two examples from case law, both involving infringers that did not 
intentionally avoid other works). 
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creation algorithm may not independently create content.  This is because the creation of a brute-
force content creation algorithm designed and intended to independently create arguably 
involves constructive notice of the existence of potential infringement, as the operator of such an 
algorithm would have reason to know the algorithm could easily infringe existing copyrights. 
B. “CREATION” BY FORCE 
Though a brute-force content creation algorithm is almost perfectly amenable to the 
doctrine of independent creation, that does not necessarily mean what it creates is copyrightable.  
In fact, there are reasons why what it generates is likely not copyrightable.  This has interesting 
ramifications for a hypothetical brute-forcing business entity: while a valid copyright is not a 
prerequisite to invoking the doctrine of independent creation, a valid copyright is necessary to 
market generated permutations without inviting competitors to copy the permutations as they 
wish.109 
Copyright protection exists in “original works of authorship” that are “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”110  “Original[ity],” as developed by the courts, entails (1) 
independent creation (discussed above111) and a (2) “modicum of creativity.”112  The bar for this 
modicum of creativity requirement is incredibly low: an “author” must merely contribute 
something more than a “merely trivial” variation,113 and courts explicitly refuse to judge the 
artistic merit of a work.114 
                                                          
109
 Though, as I discuss below, an entity could craft a ProCD-esque contract to bind users of the 
permutations to limit their dissemination or use of the permutations. 
110
 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
111
 See supra Part III.A.  The defensive use of independent creation involves the same inquiry as the use of 
independent creation involved in establishing that some creative work can be copyrighted.  2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:30 (2012) (discussing both the requirement for copyright and the defense as substantially 
the same). 
112
 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 421. 
113
 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–103 (2d Cir. 1951). 
114
 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
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Though it is almost certain given the discussion above that a brute-force content creation 
algorithm independently creates,115 it is questionable whether or not an algorithm can possess a 
“modicum of creativity.”  Admittedly, as stated above, courts set the bar of creativity for a 
copyrightable work at the floor in analyzing copyrightable material.116  In fact, given the 
weakness of the modicum of creativity requirement, older courts characterized the originality 
requirement as merely a re-statement of the prohibition on copying.117  But recent Supreme 
Court precedent indicates that the creativity requirement will be enforced where, for example, an 
alleged “creation” is merely an alphabetic arrangement of names in a directory with no creativity 
involved in the arrangement of those names.118   
It is not entirely clear that this strengthened modicum of creativity requirement is met 
where a computer is programmed to blindly generate every possible permutation of a type of 
creative work.  The generation of permutations does not necessarily entail plausibly creative 
activity, such as making “choices as to [the] selection and arrangement” of data.119  If a 
mechanically and functionally arranged “list” of names in alphabetical order is not 
copyrightable,120 a court may refuse to find that a “list” of every possible permutation of a format 
of creative work, similarly mechanically and functionally arranged, entails a modicum of 
creativity.   
                                                          
115
 See supra Part III.A. 
116
 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287, 113 L. 
Ed. 2d 358 (1991) (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. 
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, 
humble or obvious’ it might be.”). 
117
 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–103 (2d Cir. 1951). 
118
 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 
(1991).  This ruling allegedly reinstated prior law which prohibited so-called “sweat of the brow” copyrights – that 
is, copyrights for works that resulted from mere labor, not creativity.  See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 3:27 (2012). 
119
 Id. at 348. 
120
 See id. 
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This modicum of creativity requirement may not be a problem if a brute-force content 
generation algorithm were designed to be creative.  If an algorithm used “smart” brute-forcing121 
to intelligently generate a poem from a dictionary list of words using various evaluative sub-
algorithms to determine the quality of a sentence or phrase, a modicum of creativity may be 
present.  
Notwithstanding its creativity or lack thereof, is a brute-force content creation algorithm 
even an “author?”122   
It doesn’t take much to be an “author” of a copyrighted work.  In Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,123 the Supreme Court said that “author” meant someone “to whom 
anything owes its origin, originator, maker.”124  Following this loose definition, courts do not 
even require that an author physically fix the required creative expression herself: even a 
paralyzed author can be an “author” in American copyright law.125   
It is thus generally assumed that, because a human is (usually) necessarily involved in the 
creation of computer code, computer-generated works including brute-force content creation 
algorithms are copyrightable, with some human being (such as the programmer or operator of the 
                                                          
121
 See supra Part II.D. 
122
 17 U.S.C. § 201 (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors 
of the work.”) (emphasis added). 
123
 111 U.S. 53, 4 S. Ct. 279, 28 L. Ed. 349 (1884). 
124
 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58, 4 S. Ct. 279, 281, 28 L. Ed. 349 (1884). 
125
 This was discussed in Fisher v. Klein, 1990 WL 10072477 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990): 
 
[U]nder the copyright law that authorship, even with respect to sculptors, need not be in the form 
of the manipulation of the material. [W]e had some discussion of the concept of a sculptor who might sit in 
a chair, never moving and never touching the materials, perhaps in part because he might be paralyzed or 
simply because the materials might be large and heavy. There are sculptors nowadays who work in huge 
materials, I-beams, storage tanks, things like that, that are welded together where the sculptor's contribution 
is rendered entirely by the giving of instructions to workmen to put a member in a certain position and bolt 
it to another member and so forth. I think it is clear without question that such participation in authorship. 
Such carrying out of ideas of authorship is recognized as authorship under the copyright law even if the 
author never places his hand on the material. 
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program) as an author.126  Accordingly, the creator of an image who creates that image entirely 
using a computer image processing program (like Photoshop) is the author of that image for the 
purposes of copyright law.  Even though some scholarship argues that the Patent and Copyright 
Clause may permit a non-human author (such as an artificial intelligence) to be the “author” of a 
copyrightable work,127 it is unlikely that such a doctrine would be necessary when an algorithm 
is programmed and run under the supervision of a human being. This is especially the case with 
“smart” brute-forcing,128 where a programmer’s creativity and decisionmaking is more obviously 
present in the algorithm’s programming.  Assuming that a brute-force content creation algorithm 
was entirely independent and somehow did not involve the work of a programmer, this might be 
a different story129 – however, it seems unlikely such an problem would ever arise, as even 
programming self-modifying code is quite a chore.130  
Thus, brute-force content creation is almost by definition perfectly amenable to the 
doctrine of independent creation, and what it creates may be copyrightable if a modicum of 
creativity on the part of the algorithm is found.   
But the law does not work in a vacuum.  Just because something can generate 
copyrightable material does not mean that it would be found noninfringing. 
  
                                                          
126
 This is a grandiose oversimplification of the fascinating topic of computer-generated works.  For an 
excellent, albeit slightly old, analysis of the issue of computer-generated works, including the issue of authorship 
vesting in an artificial intelligence, see Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, 
and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1042–72 (1993). 
127
 See id. 
128
 See supra Part II.D. 
129
 See generally Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1042–72 (1993). 
130
 On the  topic of self-modifying code, see generally Hongxu Cai, Zhong Shao & Alexander Vaynberg, 
Certified Self-Modifying Code, PROC. 2007 ACM SIGPLAN CONF. ON PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION (PLDI’07) 66–77, available at http://flint.cs.yale.edu/flint/publications/smc.pdf. 
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IV 
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS AND REALITIES OF A BRUTE-FORCED WORLD 
 
Even if an entity actually attempted to brute-force copyright, and even if it managed to 
copyright what it made, it would not be legally immunized.  In fact, the attempted creation or use 
of brute-forced creative material may be the first shot in an all-out copyright war. 
Potential brute-force content generation business structures range the gamut from the 
nefarious to the benign.  On one hand, a true profiteer could operate a number of brute-force 
content creation servers to find and sell all permutations that resembled existing works.  On the 
other hand, a public interest organization dissatisfied with current copyright law could brute-
force creative works to attack the entire concept of the ownership of creative works131 by giving 
the public a free license to anything generated by the algorithm.  Either business model could 
elect to search for valuable permutations itself or elect to allow third parties to search for 
valuable permutations they wished to purchase.  Suffice to say, there are many permutations to 
the brute-forcing business model.132 
That being said, with the act of brute-forcing content itself as the common denominator 
of any such business model, many things can be said about the legal ramifications of content 
brute-forcing: namely, that any attempt at brute-forcing copyright would almost certainly be 
found to infringe existing copyrights. 
A. AN ALGORITHM DESIGNED TO INFRINGE(?) 
                                                          
131
 This organization could, for example, intentionally target works that would have gone into the public 
domain had the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act not gone into 
effect.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 181 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2012);  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct. 
769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2003); see also Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2004), 
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/story_lessig_marapr04.msp. 
132
 I apologize for the terrible pun. 
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One infringes copyright by violating a copyright holder’s exclusive rights.133  Among 
many other rights, including those tailored to the nuances of specific creative works,134 a 
copyright holder has the exclusive right to “reproduce [their] copyrighted work in copies.”135  
These “copies” include “substantially similar” reproductions made by any means “now known or 
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”136  Strictly speaking, this 
infringement inquiry does not rely upon whether or not the allegedly infringing materials can be 
copyrighted, as such a question comes after the question of whether or not such allegedly 
infringing materials infringe existing copyrights.  If a court finds that allegedly infringing 
materials are independently created such that they can be copyrighted,137 then it has already 
decided that such materials are not copies and thus cannot infringe.138  Conversely, no 
independent creation means no copyright and potentially means infringement.139 
If the content generated by a brute-force content creation algorithm was not amenable to 
the doctrine of independent creation, then the operator that algorithm would be in trouble: 
virtually every permutation generated by the algorithm could potentially infringe others’ 
copyrights, as it would make both actual and substantially similar copies of copyrighted works in 
violation of numerous copyright holders’ exclusive right to reproduce their work in copies.140  
                                                          
133
 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 518–19. 
134
 For example, the owner of a dramatic work has the exclusive right to perform that work publicly.  17 
U.S.C. § 106(5). 
135
 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
136
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”). 
137
 See supra Part III.A, III.B. 
138
 Independent creation acts as both a defense to copyright infringement as well as a requirement for a 
copyright under the Copyright Act.  3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:32 (2012); 2 WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:30 (2012) (discussing both the requirement for copyright and the defense as 
substantially the same); see also Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2002). 
139
 As, again, independent creation is a statutory requirement under the Copyright Act.  MERGES, MENELL 
& LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 421. 
140
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), 101. 
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That is, rather than independently creating many copyrighted works, the operator would 
effectively be potentially infringing every single copyright in existence! 
But even if such permutations were found to be independently created, a court could still 
find that such permutations were infringing despite the limitations of modern copyright law.  A 
court presented with a brute-force content creation algorithm could simply ignore the specific 
machinations of the algorithm, reducing its creation and operation to mere window-dressing 
around an attempt to infringe copyright in an intentionally obfuscated manner.  After all, what 
judge would hold “independently created” copyrighted works generated from an algorithm valid 
when such a holding would facilitate a massive loophole around current copyright law and allow 
the mass creation of copies of copyrighted works?141 
This less technical concept of infringement may seem like an extreme way to bend 
copyright law to punish seemingly “bad” behavior, but courts are no strangers to extending 
copyright law where they feel, for policy or other reasons, such an extension is warranted.  The 
best example of courts extending copyright law in this way is the development of the law of 
contributory infringement.  Unlike patent law,142 the Copyright Act “does not expressly render 
anyone liable for infringement committed by another.”143  But copyright law nonetheless 
imposes liability for copyright infringement against “certain parties who have not themselves 
engaged in the infringing activity.”144  A court might similarly find extra-statutory infringement 
where a party intentionally sets up a brute-force content creation algorithm to create identical or 
substantially similar copies of copyrighted works, even if the operation of that algorithm may not 
infringe under any current legal doctrine. 
                                                          
141
 It could also essentially decimate the world of copyright.  See infra Part IV.D. 
142
 See 37 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c). 
143
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35, 104 S. Ct. 774, 785, 78 L. Ed. 
2d 574 (1984). 
144
 Id. 
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But this is not the end of the analysis.  A brute-force content creation algorithm can both 
infringe and not infringe copyright: after all, a brute-force content creation algorithm can 
generate already copyrighted material as well as wholly novel (and thus not copyrighted) 
material in the same second. Thus, brute-force content creation algorithms are amenable via 
analogy145 to case law that involves products and devices that, like brute-force content generation 
algorithms, only sometimes infringe copyright. 
The case law about devices that sometimes infringe emerges from a case involving a 
now-dead technology: videotape recorders.  In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc.,146 the Supreme Court held that the sale of equipment that could potentially duplicate 
copyrighted works (in this case, videotape recorders that could record live television) was not 
itself contributory copyright infringement: 
[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not 
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.147   
 
In other words, the Court held that the seller of a device that can be used to infringe is not 
liable for their purchasers’ infringements as long as their device can be used for some other non-
infringing purpose.148  Subsequent courts have held that these “other purposes” – known as 
“substantial noninfringing uses” – need not even be actual, but merely capable, now or in the 
future.149  This substantial noninfringing use doctrine does not, however, provide absolute 
immunity where actual infringement under the control of the device’s creator takes place: courts 
often emphasize that computer system operators still have a duty to purge infringing material on 
                                                          
145
 “By analogy” because Sony and Grokster both are contributory infringement cases.  As I discuss later in 
this subpart, this may be largely irrelevant. 
146
 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984). 
147
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442, 104 S. Ct. 774, 789, 78 L. Ed. 2d 
574 (1984). 
148
 Id. 
149
 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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their systems when they learn about it regardless of the substantial noninfringing uses their 
system may have.150  
An important asterisk must be placed on the Sony decision: when courts smell bad intent 
on the part of a device’s creator, they find liability even where the device in question has 
substantial noninfringing uses.  In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., the Court 
acknowledged that the file-sharing services Grokster and Streamcast had potential noninfringing 
uses,151 but nonetheless found that, because Grokster and Streamcast advertised and encouraged 
infringement on their services,152 a court could find that those file-sharing services induced 
copyright infringement.153  Specifically, the Court held that a party could be liable for copyright 
infringement by “distribut[ing] a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement.”154 
But there is an asterisk to the Grokster asterisk: this intent inquiry does not impose an 
affirmative duty upon a defendant to prevent copyright infringement.  In footnote 12 of the 
Grokster opinion, the Court made a critical exception to its ruling: 
[I]n the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory 
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent 
infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such 
a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor.155 
 
                                                          
150
 See, e.g., id. at 1021. 
151
 Though the Court nonetheless was of the view that the service(s) were primarily used for infringing 
copyright. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922–23, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772, 162 
L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005) (The “vast majority of users’ downloads [were] acts of infringement.”). 
152Id. at 925.  Grokster and Streamcast advertised to former Napster users, encouraging their services as an 
alternative to Napster for (ostensibly illegal) file-sharing.  Id. 
153
 Id. at 941. 
154
 Id. at 919. 
155
 Id. at 939 fn. 12; see also Mark F. Schultz, Will Bittorrent Go the Way of Grokster? File Sharing After 
MGM v. Grokster,  ABA SCITECH LAW., Winter 2006, at 4, 5. 
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Does a brute-force content creation algorithm have a substantial noninfringing use, now 
or in the future?  The answer is unequivocally yes, at least in the abstract.  But Grokster intent is 
a problem. 
As already stated above, an algorithm designed to generate every possible permutation of 
text, images, or music is not specifically designed to infringe copyright – it generates both 
copyrighted and un-copyrighted material alike.156  In the same second an image brute-forcing 
algorithm reproduces a copyrighted photograph, it may generate an aesthetically pleasing pattern 
that has never been created or even seen before.  Thus, at least in the broadest sense, a brute-
force content creation algorithm certainly has substantial noninfringing uses under Sony.157 
But more realistically, a brute-force algorithm is valuable at least in part because it has 
the ability to independently create already copyrighted works.  In other words, brute-force 
content creation algorithms exploit a loophole in copyright law.  And that’s where Grokster 
intent becomes a problem. 
Assume a group of entrepreneurs with the time, money, and know-how to create an 
efficient and operative brute-force content creation business.  As discussed above, such a 
business would require an astounding amount of time, money, and resources158 – after all, a 
single one of Gosney’s server clusters costs approximately $10,000.159  It makes sense that this 
business would seek return on its expensive server investments, and one of the easiest ways to do 
this would be to sell independently created duplicates of existing copyrighted works.160  This 
                                                          
156
 See generally supra Part II. 
157
 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001). 
158
 See supra Part II.C. 
159
 See id. 
160
 I am far from the first person to hypothesize this.  Matt Kane, the man behind the random image 
generator “PixelMonkeys,” wrote that his greatest fear about random image technology was “that some evil 
corporation someday will write an algorithm to increase the potential to create recognizable images and create a 
giant library of images.”  Matt Kane, Frequently Asked Questions, PIXELMONKEYS.COM, 
http://www.pixelmonkeys.org/#faq (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
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business model would require a remarkably low amount of effort on the part of the brute-forcing 
entity as, rather than spending the time and money sifting through permutation after permutation 
to ascertain market value by itself, the brute-forcing entity could create a search engine where 
potential purchasers could search through a collection of algorithm-generated works to find what 
they wanted to buy.161  Needless to say, if the brute-forcing entity sold licenses to its 
permutations for less than copies of the original works cost,162 the it could easily profit. 
Accordingly, even though an otherwise infringing brute-force content creation algorithm 
may have substantial noninfringing uses, considering its use would almost certainly involve the 
nefarious intent to undermine copyright, the Grokster exception would almost certainly apply 
and the algorithm’s substantial noninfringing uses would not provide a defense to infringement.  
Such an algorithm may not be itself commercially distributed as was the case in Grokster,163 but 
this is almost certainly immaterial: Sony itself involved sale and distribution,164 so it is unlikely 
that a defendant could invoke Sony as a defense without implicitly conceding that both Sony and 
Grokster apply when no sale or distribution occurs.   
But assuming that the owners of the brute-force content generation algorithm were not 
nefarious profiteers, Grokster’s footnote 12 could provide a valuable safe harbor.  If those 
utilizing a brute-force content creation algorithm did so not because of a desire to undermine 
copyright but instead because of a legitimate desire to produce new and unique works, then the 
mere fact that copyrighted work incidentally appeared on their storage devices would be 
                                                          
161
 The potential infringement ramifications of these searches are discussed infra in Part IV.B. 
162
 An entity could arguably sell contractual “licenses” even if the permutations were not amenable to 
copyright.  Contracts may legally bind parties to copyright-like terms even when the contractual res is not amenable 
to copyright protection.  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996).  That being said, such 
contracts would not prevent other businesses from copying the permutations –they would only bind the parties 
involved.  
163
 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770, 
162 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005). 
164
 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442, 104 S. Ct. 774, 789, 78 L. Ed. 
2d 574 (1984). 
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inconsequential.165  Such do-gooders would not have an affirmative duty to sift through every 
permutation and delete infringing content to act within the ambit of copyright law.166  
Unfortunately, these do-gooders would likely be forced to sift through every permutation 
anyway to find something useful in a massive database of algorithm-generated nonsense.  
Thus, the operator of a brute-force content creation algorithm would in most 
circumstances be infringing many copyrights, if not potentially every copyright in existence.  
Even though the Sony line of cases might appear to immunize brute-forcing behavior by analogy, 
those cases would not provide a defense to those most likely to operate a brute-force content 
creation algorithm: profiteers looking to generate plausibly legal copies of existing copyrighted 
works.  Simply put, a brute-force content creation algorithm is one massive infringement case 
waiting to happen, even if a court has to proverbially bend over backwards to make it such. 
B.  THE INDUCEMENT PROBLEM 
A brute-force content creation algorithm could also infringe copyright depending on the 
way third parties use brute-forced permutations.  This could occur in two ways: first, by merely 
allowing parties to search through the permutations themselves, and second, by selling or giving 
parties permutations to enable those third parties to infringe. 
As illustrated in Part I,167 a brute-forcing algorithm can easily generate a huge number of 
permutations.  This is a problem: manually sifting through permutations to find something 
valuable (such as an exact duplicate of another’s copyrighted work) would be prohibitively 
expensive and time-consuming, especially considering how reasonable minds could differ as to 
the artistic merit of any given permutation. 
                                                          
165
 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 fn. 12, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
162 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005). 
166
 See id. at 939 fn. 12; see also Mark F. Schultz, Will Bittorrent Go the Way of Grokster? File Sharing 
After MGM v. Grokster,  ABA SCITECH LAW., Winter 2006, at 4, 5. 
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 See supra Part II. 
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An easier way to search through permutations would be to use a computer system to find 
a duplicate of an already existing copyrighted work within the permutations,168 but this raises an 
infringement issue.  Assuming that merely storing and generating brute-forced permutations did 
not constitute infringement in and of itself,169 could searching through these permutations to find 
a copyrighted work constitute a form of infringement by either the brute-forcing entity or a third 
party?  If a third party used an existing copyrighted work (like an image) to find a duplicate of it 
in a brute-force content collection, would that act constitute infringement? 
The mere indexing and searching of content is not, in and of itself, an infringement of 
copyright.  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,170 Perfect 10 sued Google and Amazon.com 
for copyright infringement because both defendants allowed users to search for Perfect 10 
material stored on third party websites.171  Because neither defendant stored the full versions of 
Perfect 10’s photographs,172 the court found that the defendants did not infringe Perfect 10’s 
display right as to the full versions of the works.173  In other words, only where storage of 
infringing works occurs will liability attach.174  Perfect 10 indicates that, absent some other form 
of infringement involving the subject material, making indexing and searching of non-infringing 
material feasible is not independently a violation of copyright. 
                                                          
168
 Google already does something similar with their Google Images search engine: a user can upload any 
digital image and be given results based on the image, including places in which it (or images very similar to it) are 
located online. See Search by Image, GOOGLE.COM, 
http://www.google.com/insidesearch/features/images/searchbyimage.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). In a brute-
force content creation database, this could be achieved using MD5 checksum algorithms, which can be used to 
compare everything from images to bioinformatics sequence identifiers.  See, e.g., Mike Smith et al., MagicMatch – 
Cross-Referencing Sequence Identifiers Across Databases, 21:16 BIOINFORMATICS 3429–30 (June 16, 2005), 
available at http://bioinformatics.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/16/3429.full. 
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 An unlikely circumstance, given how likely such actions alone would be infringing.  See supra Part 
IV.A. 
170
 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
171
 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2007). 
172
 Google did, however, store thumbnails, which were found to be protected by fair use.  Id. at 1160, 
1163–68. 
173
 Id. at 1159–63. 
174
 See id. 
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Thus, where infringement arguments based upon the storage of brute-force generated 
content fail, the aforementioned search argument would fail as well.  While there might be an 
argument that the use of an existing copyrighted work as a referent in the process of searching 
for a duplicate of it is a form of infringement, this does not seem to be a particularly fruitful 
argument.  Given the strength of the underlying infringement argument discussed above,175 this 
is not truly a major loss for a would-be plaintiff. 
Perhaps more important is the question of third party infringement by using brute-forced 
permutations as a substitute for copyrighted material.  While the concept of secondary liability in 
copyright is “muddied,”176 it is generally accepted that one who, “with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, 
may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”177  If brute-forced permutations are not 
amenable to copyright,178 the provision of those permutations to third parties to enable those 
parties to indirectly acquire existing copyrighted works without acquiring a license to those 
copyrighted works would almost certainly be a form of contributory infringement.  After all, part 
of the value of brute-forced permutations would be their similarity to existing copyrighted work, 
and the purchaser of such a low-cost permutation would almost certainly not possess a license to 
the original work.  Selling those permutations would be little better than selling pirated copies of 
a copyrighted movie on the Internet. 
                                                          
175
 See supra Part IV.A. 
176
 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:41 (2012) (discussing how, in Sony, the Supreme 
Court used the doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious liability interchangeably). 
177
 Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); see also 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 914, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2767, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781 
(2005). 
178
 As is almost certainly the case.  See supra Part III.  Note that if they were copyrightable, then license to 
the generated permutations could arguably be given, like Learned Hand’s Ode on a Grecian Urn example.  See 
supra Part III.A. 
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A brute-force content creation entity could potentially limit its contributory infringement 
liability under this scenario by carefully contracting with the third party buyers of its 
permutations.  In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
allowed a software manufacturer to enforce so-called “shrink-wrap licenses” – that is, licenses 
included with software that placed additional limitations on the use of that software – that 
extended protection of its works beyond the scope afforded to them under the Copyright Act.179  
The court in Zeidenberg allowed these shrink-wrap licenses because “[c]ontracts . . . generally 
affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive 
rights.’”180  ProCD thus seems to embrace the idea that a brute-force content generating entity 
could create and enforce shrink-wrap licenses (or their equivalent) to prevent third-parties from 
using a permutation without a license from the original copyright holder, thereby potentially 
avoiding contributory infringement liability.  Given the controversy of ProCD,181 it may not be 
the case that such a contract would be upheld in every court, but shrink wrap licenses are 
nonetheless an option for an already risk-taking brute-forcing entity. 
C. THE TRADEMARK DIMENSION 
Brute-force content creation would almost certainly entail the mass replication of both 
registered and unregistered trademarks.  This could make the content produced by a brute-force 
content creation algorithm a trademark infringement landmine.  But, perhaps thankfully, because 
permutations are unlikely to create consumer confusion, it is unlikely that a brute-force content 
creation algorithm would ever be found to infringe trademark. 
                                                          
179
 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996).  These contracts extended 
beyond the scope of copyright because the underlying material protected in the ProCD contract was unprotectable 
by copyright post-Feist.  See id. 
180
 Id. at 1454. 
181
 See generally David Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption after Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 610–613 (2004); Brian Covotta & Pamela Sergreef, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 13 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 35 (1998); 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 18:26 (2012). 
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“Trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, device, or combination used by a person 
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured 
or sold by others.182  A trademark must be inherently distinctive – that is, unique and 
immediately identifiable as identifying a unique product source – or must have “secondary 
meaning” – which means the mark must have an established connection with a unique product 
source.183  Once these requirements are established, when a mark is federally registered, the mere 
act of using that mark in connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services such that 
the use would “likely . . . cause confusion” is infringement of that mark.184  When a mark is 
unregistered, the use must cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the “affiliation, 
connection, or association” of the entity with the mark’s owner to constitute infringement.185  In 
either case, there is no independent creation defense in trademark law.186  
Arguably, the sale or even provision of brute-forced content could be considered a form 
of trademark infringement.  For example, an image brute-forcing algorithm might generate an 
image permutation that depicted the Nike logo or an audio permutation that used the trademarked 
slogan “King of Beers.”187  As the argument might go, because trademark law has no 
independent creation doctrine,188 the sale or use of such a permutation could constitute an 
infringing use of that trademark. 
Unfortunately for a would-be plaintiff, it is not clear whether consumers would be 
actually confused by a brute-force content generation algorithm’s use of a mark such that the 
                                                          
182
 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
183
 See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983); MERGES, MENELL & 
LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 751. 
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 Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 
185
 Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
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 Douglas Y'Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right Conferred by Copyright, 49 MERCER L. 
REV. 643, 683 (1998). 
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existence of that mark in a permutation would be infringing.  With the right disclaimers, a brute-
forcing entity could avoid creating consumer confusion in the way that would expose itself to 
liability for infringement.189  But such a disclaimer may not be necessary.  In Medic Alert 
Foundation U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp.,190 the court held that the presence of a logo in a software 
clipart library collection was not trademark infringement because users would not have been 
confused into believing that the owner of each respective mark was endorsing the defendant’s 
collection.191  A brute-forced content collection is arguably analogous to a collection of clipart: 
neither use trademarks in a way that implicate association, sponsorship, or any affiliation such 
that consumers would be confused.  This is especially the case where consumers know about the 
nature of the permutations: no rational consumer would believe that an algorithmically generated 
permutation was intentionally designed to affiliate with a unique product source.  Thus, it is 
unlikely that a court would find consumer confusion if a trademark was generated by a brute-
force content creation algorithm. 
A more viable approach might be the argument of dilution by blurring, but Medic Alert-
like issues still apply.  Where a famous mark is used by a party in a way that could potentially 
dilute the potency of that mark (by reducing its ability to identify a single source and maintain 
selling power or the like), the owner of that mark may sue.192  The test for dilution by blurring 
involves a number of factors, including whether the user of the mark intended to create an 
association with the famous mark and whether there was any actual association between the 
allegedly infringing mark and the famous mark.193  Assuming some famous mark (such as the 
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Nike swoosh) made its way into a permutation, trademark infringement would plausibly exist.  
But the Medic Alert problem still exists for a would-be plaintiff.  Given that the nature of the use 
of a famous mark is evaluated in a case of dilution by blurring,194 a court could plausibly find 
that, like in Medic Alert, the incidental use of a mark in a database that was unlikely to cause 
consumer confusion would not qualify as dilution by blurring.  
One factor that almost certainly does not influence either trademark infringement 
calculus is whether or not the brute-forcing entity purported to provide its brute-forced content 
for free.  Non-commercial use is a defense to trademark infringement, though it has never been 
entirely clear what non-commercial use entails.195  Thus, at least theoretically, if a brute-forcing 
entity provided its work for free, it could avoid being liable for trademark infringement.  But this 
result is only theoretical: it ignores the fact that, even if it provided its content for free, a non-
commercial entity would usually seek to provide its content for free to directly undermine or 
manipulate the market for copyrighted materials (unless, of course, it was simply hunting for 
unique patterns or novel permutations or the like).196  This sort of behavior is quite unlike the 
archetypal non-commercial trademark user who, for example, uses a trademark to complain 
about a company.197  Thus, even though infringement is unlikely to be proven, non-commercial 
use of brute-forced permutations would not provide a defense would brute-force content creation 
infringe trademark. 
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D. COPYRIGHT WAR 
The idea that any entity could brute-force copyright is positively frightening.  If a single 
entity could construct an algorithm that made every possible 4-minute song ever, then that entity 
would have the power to sell exact copies of other artists’ 4-minute songs for cheaper than the 
artists sold them.  The incentive to create could become a disincentive, as musicians would 
suddenly find even the most original songs they could ever compose anticipated by a computer 
algorithm that could undercut their profits. 
In loftier constitutional terms, a brute-force content creation algorithm would prevent 
copyright from “promot[ing] the Progress of Science.”198 
Or, more bluntly, it would kill copyright.  
 Suffice to say, it is unlikely that a court would ever allow this to happen in the first place.  
Before such a scheme could ever begin, it is almost certain that a court would stop a brute-force 
content creator through one or more methods – be it a strict “modicum of creativity” standard,199 
an attenuated standard of infringement,200 or the like.  This is especially the situation where, in 
most cases, Grokster intent would weigh against the operator of a brute-force content creation 
algorithm.201 
But assuming through some apocalyptic judicial catastrophe that the above arguments 
failed, would a party operating a brute-force content generation algorithm win?  Once that party 
gets past the hurdles of skirting the copyright and trademark infringement issues discussed 
above, are they legally home free? 
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 The answer is almost certainly no, because such an algorithm would kill copyright.  The 
fact that a brute-force content creation algorithm would in effect give a copyright in every 
possible work ever to a single party would give every single judge, legislator, and citizen a 
reason to specifically prohibit that from happening.  When someone finds a loophole in the law 
that grants them a legal right to every creative work that could ever be created, the societal 
response would never be “you win” – it would be “we need to amend the laws.” 
 In other words, operating a brute-force content creation algorithm would be the first shot 
in all-out copyright war between a single entity and the entire legal and political community of 
the United States, if not the world.  It is not hard to imagine who would win. 
V 
CONCLUSION: WHY “NEVER” IS A GOOD THING 
 
 As has been repeatedly emphasized in this paper, it is almost certain that it is 
technically202 and legally203 impossible for anyone to brute-force copyright in the near future.  
This is, unquestionably, a very good thing. 
 Imagine a brute-forced collection of four-minute sound recordings.  What would be 
within those recordings?  Not just songs, but human experiences.  Four minute conversations, 
laughs, cries, speeches – quite literally everything.  The whole of the human experience that 
could be heard would, insofar as it fits into a four minute digital recording, be located on 
computer disks squirreled away within a huge series of processing servers.  This would include 
everything you have ever heard, as well as everything you will ever hear.  This is no less the case 
for an attempted brute-force attack on images the size of a Google logo – everything that could 
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ever be seen that could be represented in a small bundle of pixels on a monitor would be 
generated and stored. 
 As disappointing as it may be that current technology cannot yet brute-force creative 
content,204 this is actually a good thing: it proves how amazingly diverse and unique the world 
can be.  If it were easy to simply brute-force through every song ever made, then the actual 
number of songs that could ever be made would be rather small.205  There is no romance or 
magic to a world of creative content that can be divided, processed, and in the end conquered by 
an emotionless machine designed to feign creative activity. 
 Of course, creative activity does not rely upon copyright, and if copyright were to 
disappear, many authors would still create amazing works.  But a brute-force content creation 
attack is not merely a war upon copyright: it is a war on creation.  It is an attempt to preclude 
anyone from creating anything truly new ever again, even if the algorithm itself never uses the 
work it generates.   
 This is why, somewhat counter-intuitively, we should hope that technology is never able 
to process the insane number of permutations discussed in Part II.206  When all songs, paintings, 
and poems have been generated, then the desire for artists to pick up their respective guitars, 
paint brushes, and pens will be inhibited, if not entirely destroyed, and part of the enjoyment that 
arises from creative material – that is, the knowledge that an individual or group individuals 
poured their lives and selves into a project for others’ enjoyment – would be decimated. 
 Thus, my discussion ends not with a legal conclusion, but a normative one: the world 
does not need brute-force content creation algorithms.  In an attempt to make money, someone 
                                                          
204
 See supra Part II.C. 
205
 Of course, “rather small” in the sense that one of Gosney’s servers could have eventually brute-forced it 
at 350 billion guesses per second.  See supra Part II.C. 
206
 See supra Part II. 
Sigmon 42 
 
running such an algorithm would not merely kill copyright – they would kill the entire human 
drive to create around which copyright laws have formed. 
